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The Oldest Trick in the Book: 
Borges and the "Rhetoric of Immediacy" 
by James Winchell 
Stanford University 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment [Verhexung] of our 
intelligence by means of language. 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 
De la, peut-titre, un moyen d'evaluer les oeuvres de la modemite: 
leur valeur viendrait de leur duplicite. 
Roland Barthes, Le Plaisir du texte 
What does it mean to be a Buddhist? To be a Buddhist is-not to 
understand, because that can be accomplished in a few minutes- 
but to feel the four noble truths and the eightfold path. 
Jorge Luis Borges, "Buddhism" in Seven Nights 
In his most "philosophical" texts, Jorge Luis Borges posits the act 
of reading as the scene of experience: his reader reads a reader reading 
(ad infinitum). Characteristically, this highly mediated imitation of the 
act of critical attention comes to mirror the substantive preoccupation of 
the "philosophical" text itself, according to the epigraph above from 
Wittgenstein: both the bewitchment and the battle against the bewitch- 
ment of our intelligence by language. 
Borges thereby creates "duplicitous" works of high modernity, in 
the sense suggested in the epigraph above from Barthes, by imitating the 
double game of modern philosophy: he pretends to speak the language 
of the Master of presence while laying a fatally mimetic trap for him 
(Descombes 1980, 138-139). He therefore breaks down the "concept 
fetishism" of philosophy by making mimesis his textual concept (Adorno 
1973, 12).' 
Italo Calvino has pointed out the originary moment in Borges' career 
when this strategy emerged, its "mechanism" and the place this 
innovation assumes in literary history: 
The last great invention of a new literary genre in our time was 
achieved by . . . Jorge Luis Borges. . . . The idea . . . was to pretend 
that the book he wanted to write had already been written by 
someone else, some unknown hypothetical author--an author in a 1
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different language, of a different culture-and that his task was to 
describe and review this invented book. Part of the Borges legend is 
the anecdote that when the first extraordinary story written accord- 
ing to this formula, "El acercamiento a Almotasim" 'The Approach 
to Al'Mutasim,' appeared in the magazine Sur in 1940, it was in fact 
believed to be a review of a book by an Indian author. In the same 
way, critics of Borges feel bound to observe that each of his texts 
doubles or multiplies its own space through the medium of other 
books belonging to a real or imaginary library, whether they be 
classical, erudite or merely invented. (50) 
Given Calvino's claim for the novelty of "The Approach to Al- 
Mu'tasim" in relation to modem genres, I propose a closer look at its 
formal and rhetorical procedures. My thesis is two-fold: first, that this 
typically Borgesian narrative juxtaposes concept ("philosophy") and 
mimesis ("bewitchment") and then subverts the difference between 
them as a mediation of immediacy itself He creates thereby a second- 
degree "rhetoric of immediacy. "2 
Consequently, the self-referentiality he exploits in this process poses 
the problem of significance and meaning on two levels: first, in the sphere 
of the intertext (of texts real or imaginary, written or written about); and 
second, in the desire and askesis (renunciation ofdesire for desire's sake) 
of the reader confronted by this text of texts (Girard 1965, 153-75). 
The new genre implied by this modern "duplicity" is first elabo- 
rated in "The Approach to Al-Mu'tasim" on at least two narrative levels: 
as recounted by Borges' narrator in his description of Mir Bahadur Ali's 
novel of the same title, and as "experienced" by the non-existent novel's 
protagonist himself in his search for the eponymous Other. Borges' 
"invention," then, might be stated as the paradox of the "successful" 
critical hoax: like the tale of forensic mysticism recounted in the story 
itself, "The Approach to Al-Mu'tasim" is an "authentic" forgery, a 
"genuine" imitation, a "real" fake. 
Borges' original desire to write the full-dress novel called The 
Approach to Al-Mu 'tasim, complete with "round characters," direct 
speech and descriptions, becomes therefore a "trans-formed" desire in 
the story as written: the secondary text to the originally un-writeable 
(non-scriptible) primary one. According to Derridean logic, this move 
"can only seem to be a metaphysical reappropriation of truth [Such] 
Reflexive literature, in wishing to be seen as a total discourse, self- 
sufficient,per causa sui ,is a disguised theology" (Dupuy 1989, 503). But 
the question remains: disguised as what? And informed by what rhetori- 
cal strategies? 2




The answer lies in the double nature of self-referentiality, which in 
Borges, as in all "consciously self-referential literature," refers not once 
but twice: "first, to itself; and second, to . . . self-reference itself, 
understood here as a property of the world and in particular of human 
desire" (Dupuy 1989, 492; emphasis mine). 
The drama in "The Approach to Al-Mu'tasim" emerges therefore 
in the narrator's passage from the assertion of critical mastery in the 
intertext toward its gradual, unspoken renunciation in the world (of 
Borges' text and of its reader). In the final two paragraphs of the story, 
his "anxieties of influence" emerge as the overwhelming problem of his 
critical practice, a problem ever-more-mediated by the nature of Al- 
Mu'tasim himself. 
The narrator's demonstration in the story-that the seeker is iden- 
tical, ultimately, with the one sought-itself imitates the substantive 
claim made not only in the Indian novel under review, but also in two 
other, more traditional genies of revelation: the mystical text of initiation 
through deconstructed immediacy, and the heuristic allegory. Both often 
exploit the forensic hermeneutics of the mirror, the Word and the 
"threshold gesture" of presence as ways to expose the thoroughly 
mediated quality of all desire. 
Borges thus arrives at a modernist re-inscription of the kind of 
narrative technique upon which traditional texts, even texts that form a 
part of a sacred canon, operate. Zen Buddhism, for example, poses its 
threshold narratives and riddles, the koans, precisely in terms of the 
mystique of presence and the persistence of absence. The drama and 
rhetoric of immediacy exploited by Borges-and what is allegory, if not 
a "rhetorical drama"?-far from amounting to the last innovation of 
modern forms, as Calvino claims, might more accurately be called the 
oldest trick of presence in the book of absence. 
Indeed, Borges' genre-bender may well be judged a "sacred" text 
masquerading as a "profane" one. This paradox-which might be 
called the paradox of the "authentically profane"-emerges primarily 
because "The Approach to Al-Mu'tasim" commands the reader's 
conversion and must, therefore, be interpreted mimetically even as it is 
read conceptually. 
These categories participate in hermeneutics, the art of the interpret- 
ers of divinatory signs, oracles, or omens, of "words that tell us what we 
are and what it is our lot to be" (Descombes 1986, 21).3 Borges imitates 
this discourse of divination by fashioning a narrator who is a practitioner 
of hermeneutics, but at the same time skeptically unendowed with the 
belief system inherent in the text he is "approaching" and interpreting. 
In this narrator/character, Borges provides the reader with both a model 3
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and an obstacle: the urbane critic is initially a "model" of taste, 
discernment and culture, disinterested and objective; he also presents a 
disenchanted stumbling block or screen through which the "primary" 
material of the novel-the bewitchment of intelligence when faced with 
the inadequacy of language and the terror of the sacred-must be 
projected. 
Historically, the reader's Borgesian predicament in "The Approach 
to Al-Mu'tasim" resembles two well-known cases of hermeneutic 
(mis)reading: the interpretation of Homer by the Alexandrian and the 
Protestant reinterpretation of the Bible in the nineteenth century 
(Descombes 1986, 24). All three feature a text, philologically obscure, 
culturally different but not grammatically indecipherable, whose pro- 
phetic meaning is ambiguous, not inaccessible. The reader of this 
"foreign" text (in Borges, the narrator) struggles to approach "the 
message it would yield if it were indeed the Text that an entire tradition 
has suggested (the Poem, the Bible)" (Descombes 1986, 24). 
For hermeneutics in the strictest sense, faith is a pre-condition for an 
approach to any text that posits the possibility, or even the inevitability, 
of divine revelation. Because the Borgesian narrator manipulates a 
rhetoric of critical distance and disbelief, however, the reader's "disbe- 
lief" is thereby engaged mimetically, sharing "critically" as she does 
the narrator's bookish or profane skepticism. For Borges this mimesis- 
in which the reader initially grants the narrator credibility in imitation of 
his own claims to it-becomes, as noted above, the concept of the text. 
The confusion experienced in 1940 by the readers of Borges' story when 
it was published in Sur (as described by Calvino, above) proves this 
phenomenon.' 
Thus, Borges paradoxically dramatizes the "necessity of interpre- 
tation" based on the hermeneutic situation as traditionally defined, in 
which: 
I receive the sign of a power that reveals itself to me through the very 
sign it has sent. Interpretation is permissible whenever it is neces- 
sary, but such necessity is valid only for signs confined to the area 
of revelation, the templum: outside the temple, there are no 
hermeneutics. Beyond the temple lies the delirium of interpretation. 
The condition of interpreting signs given within the temple is that 
outside it, in profanity, there are different procedures for understand- 
ing. (Descombes 1986, 25) 
Borges' narrator therefore straddles the demarcation between sacred 
and profane, between hermeneutic legitimacy and extramural delirium. 4




Nevertheless, the novel of detection and ratiocination, clearly situated on 
the "horizon of expectations" he brings to his reading of Mir Bahadur 
Ali's novel, represents for him a "sacred" textual tradition whose 
literary conventions form a part of his own "comparativeness." 
On the other hand, he is also an outsider faced with the Unknowable 
at the center of the book under review. For this "heathen" reader of an 
obscure intercultural text, the confines of the hermeneutic temple 
explode in the volatile, "analytic" antinomy of mimesis and logical 
skepticism: "What can be shown," writes Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, 
"cannot be said" (26). The shards will be pieced together at the 
conclusion, in the narrator's intertextual shrine (Chesterton, Spenser, 
Joyce, Homer, Kipling, Eliot, Farid ud-din Attar) that will enact, by a 
performative sort of rhetorical bootstrapping, a substitution of itself for 
the sacred site or Text of the faithful. 
The Borgesian templum is constructed in the interstices of intertexts 
whose concepts are produced, again, mimetically: the urbane narrator/ 
character/interpreter in "The Approach to Al-Mu'tasim" imitates a 
critic more than he writes "critically." For starters, he cites two other 
critics to demonstrate that he belongs in the field of argumentation, then 
deftly places both of them in the same sack by repeating their common 
agreement that the novel is a "hybridization" that "may cause us to 
imagine some likeness with Chesterton; we will soon see," he concludes 
authoritatively, "that there is no such thing" (Borges 37).5 Chesterton is 
therefore inimitable; Mir Bahadur Ali, the Bombay lawyer and author of 
the novel The Approach to Al-Mu 'tasim, it is implied, is equally so. 
This denial of "imitability," logically enough, propounds the 
narrator's first paradox regarding his own method: metaphysical desire 
is insufficiently provoked by mere mimesis of the first degree (i.e., in the 
form of intertextual "borrowing"); rather, the requisite model for 
"immediate" imitation must be inimitable. His conclusion, as I shall 
show, explicitly criticizes those critics who manifest their "harebrained 
admiration" of the "derivations" detected in current works from ancient 
ones. Instead, he will discuss these "influences" in terms of 
metempsychosis, or "Ibbilr, " for this, too, is a necessarily "unmediated" 
term for mimesis. 
The critical concept of "hybridization" is pronounced not to be 
applicable to the Bombay lawyer's novel, but the evocation of the 
"hybrid" signals an initial self-referential moment of Borges' tale along 
with the title it uncannily shares with the novel ostensibly under review. 
The narrator's sovereign rejection of his predecessors' critical evaluation 
("hybridization") serves as the first grounding for his superior mastery 
of the text of the text. In this he shares an understanding with the Russian 5
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Formalists, who held that it is neither the works nor the genres that 
change; rather, "they [works and genres] are the products of transforma- 
tions, trans-forms" (Ducrot & Todorov, 189; my translation). Borges' 
story therefore becomes not only an imitation of criticism, a simulacrum 
of concept-driven discourse, but also an allegory of literary history, genre 
theory and the sensory moment of reading itself not the hybrid, but the 
product of the hybrid of the hybrids, the trans-form. This explains 
Calvino's enthusiasm for Borges' text as "the last great invention of a 
literary genre in our time." 
Its "plot" (or significance over time) unfolds therefore in the gaps 
between the reader, hermeneutic "legitimacy" and the narrator's critical 
expertise. The form of the frame narrative in which the narrator exists 
(inasmuch as he writes), consequently, manifests as much signifying 
content as the framed tale paraphrased, "conceptualized" and criticized 
by the narrator from outside. Both recount the renunciation of appetitive 
desire in the name of metaphysical desire (I will address the Girardian 
dimension of this issue below). The generative source of these narrative 
concepts, therefore, is located "affectively," in a narrative simulation of 
a critico-sensory presence, performatively self-manifesting in its own 
scene of writing. 
How does Borges pull this off technically? First, the Bombay 
lawyer's book is evoked as an object, in terms of its hors texte. The paper 
used for the editio princeps, the narrator tells us, "was almost the quality 
of newsprint." The cover of this edition "proclaimed to the buyer that 
the book was the first detective novel written by a native of Bombay 
City." The second, illustrated edition "has just been reproduced and 
issued in London by Victor Gollancz, with a prologue by Dorothy L. 
Sayers, and the omission-perhaps merciful-of the illustrations." The 
narrator's credible presence is everywhere accentuated in this passage, 
from the use of familiar names of flesh-and-blood historical personages 
(Gollancz and Sayers) to the discerning judgment concerning illustra- 
tions ( "- perhaps merciful-"). The details of this second edition all 
prepare the story's first climax of presence or rhetorical immediacy 
regarding the book of the book: "I have it in front of me," the narrator 
states in a deceptively simple, matter-of-fact way. Derrida's well-known 
dictum is apt here: for Borges, "II n'y a pas de hors-texte" (1972, 
passim). 
The original edition, the one absent from the narrator's consider- 
ation except for sparse "traces" of its existence, approaches the status 
of sacred text precisely because it is unavailable to the "infidel" narrator. 
The source for the clues upon which he bases his editorial judgment- 
that the first is "far superior" to the second edition-is an appendix 6




"which summarizes the fundamental difference between the primitive 
version of 1932 and the 1934 edition." The only further detail we have 
concerning this index is not what it contains, but rather that it somehow 
legitimates this critical opinion itself "I am authorized in this last 
judgment by an appendix. . . ." 
The far more telling information available to us regarding the 
superiority of the first edition is contained in the change of title in the 
second: The Approach to Al Mu 'tasim (1932) has been changed in 1934 
to The Conversation with the Man Called Al-Mu 'tasim "and handsomely 
subtitled," the narrator tells us admiringly, "A Game with Shifting 
Mirrors." This "superiority" is intimated by a metaphysical devalua- 
tion revealed in the changed title: where the second promises a "Conver- 
sation" with the "Man" called Al-Mu'tasim, indicating presence, the 
first promises only "the approach" to his suspected or intuited presence, 
implying a passage through a series of stages marked rather by his 
absence. The subtitle, similarly, adds a new layer of specular reflexivity, 
even of baroque sensibility (a frivolous "game" of mobile mirrors) that 
may work to undermine or multiply the presence of Al-Mu' tasim implied 
by the phonocentric promise of a "conversation" with him. 
But as we have learned, along with the readers of Sur in 1940, not 
to reduce the flesh-and-blood Borges to his narrator (who may bear no 
resemblance even to the "Other Borges"), hints are dropped (without 
comment) that imply in Mir Bahadur Ali's protagonist significant 
parallels with Mir Bahadur Ali himself. For the "visible protagonist" of 
the novel is also in law (a student, implying autobiographical precedence 
and authenticity) and also from Bombay. 
This information comes in the first sentence of a long paragraph of 
detailed vicissitudes, paraphrased by the narrator as if in rapid cinematic 
montage. The opening scene of holy war ("a civil tumult between 
Moslems and Hindus") catches the disbelieving protagonist (who has 
"blasphemously" rejected the "Islamic faith of his fathers") in its 
midst. This "free-thinking [law] student," "aghast" at the violence 
unleashed by the battle of "God the Indivisible against the Gods," joins 
in and "With desperate hands he kills (or thinks he kills) a Hindu." This 
crime, whether willed or accidental--for it is a member of the "other 
side" he kills-or is it, since he is a "free thinker" and not allied with 
either faction?-in any case, whether fatal or not ("or thinks he killed"), 
this desperate act precipitates his flight. 
His next encounter, with a "despoiler of cadavers" who hides in a 
circular tower, provides the reader with a wealth of allegorical informa- 
tion that the narrator, once again, neither explicates nor renders explicit. 
The protagonist, despite the judgments he passes upon his corpse- 7
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robbing companion (he is "squalid," "minutely vile " --or is this the 
narrator's choice of adjectives?), actually comes to share symbolic as 
well as physical space with him. The "vile" thief, who "mentions that 
fourteen nights have passed since he last purified himself with buffalo 
dung," expresses hatred for "certain horse thieves in Guzerat, 'eaters of 
dogs and lizards, men as unclean as the two ofus. " ' This instance of direct 
discourse by a character in the novel under review, when reported directly 
by the narrator, assumes a special significance. The revelation that the 
law student is on an equal footing with a man he views so far beneath him 
is sufficiently startling, sufficiently sublime, that it merits direct citation 
by the frame narrator. 
A great chain of mediation is thus established: the reader (of Borges' 
story) has her reading of the novel mediated by the narrator, who himself 
cannot gain access to the "authentic" 1932 edition; the protagonist, who 
at the time of his encounter with the despoiler of corpses is not yet aware 
of his fate as an "approach" to anything, has his status (social and 
religious) mediated by the "untouchable. " This "squalid man," "squat- 
ting by the light of the moon and urinating noisily," is merely the first 
in an "ascending progression" of "interlocutors" whose mediations 
mark the approach, in a text "burdened . . . [with] mathematical 
technicality," to Al-Mu'tasim himself. The conversation with the corpse 
robber--the only one cited directly by the narrator-implies that Al- 
Mu'tasim may be found at the beginning rather than the end of the chain. 
Narrative, like time, loses thereby its linearity; commenting on intertextual 
influences, the narrator will confirm, in the last line of the last note in the 
story, the possibility that "Al- Mu'tasim is the 'Hindu' whom the student 
believes he has killed" in the book's opening incident6 The religious 
nature of this violence is not negligible; again, I will address Girard's 
theory on these issues below. 
The protagonist's commission of this murder in a holy war is 
compounded, thereafter, by a precipitate tumble in social and moral 
("unclean") status. Upon awakening he undergoes two further falls. 
First, he realizes he has been robbed by the corpse-robbing thief, his 
former equal, which now puts the law student closer to the land of the dead 
than the land of the living. Secondly, "He meditates on how he has shown 
himself capable of killing an idolater, but not of knowing for certain 
whether a Moslem is more justified in his beliefs than a Hindu." This 
second truth, like the first, displaces him in both social and sacred realms: 
he now knows himself comparable to the unclean, capable of irrational, 
murderous violence, and equally incapable of rational distinctions in 
theology. He departs in search of a "malka-sansi (a woman of the robber 
caste) of Palanpur," about whom the thief had spoken vituperatively. As 8




Carter Wheelock states it, "The student reasons that vilification by such 
a man is tantamount to praise, and he resolves to go in search of the 
woman. So the search for Almotasim [sic] really begins here as a reaction 
against that which is not Almotisim" (Wheelock 151). More important 
than the mere fact of this "reaction against that which is not Almotasim" 
is the effectively negative mediation by his corpse-robbing opposite-and- 
equal, which event " . . concludes the second chapter of the work." 
During a thoroughly undifferentiated sacrificial crisis, Borges' logic tells 
us, the rhetoric of vilification serves just as well as the rhetoric of praise 
to propel the student toward the absent sacred. 
The narrator then avows the impossibility of retelling the nineteen 
chapters that remain, and resorts once again to cinematographically 
mounted details, generalizations ("a biography which seems to exhaust 
the movements of the human spirit"), paraphrases and place names that 
trace a geographical, narratological and spiritual circle. The conclusion 
of the montage of time and place effaces the protagonist from its purview, 
as "the story" becomes the grammatical subject of a miraculously 
"bewitched" sentence: 
The story which begins in Bombay continues in the lowlands of 
Palanpur, lingers an afternoon and a night at the stone gates of 
Bikaner, narrates the death of a blind astrologer in a Benares sewer, 
conspires in the multiform palace of Katmandu, prays and forni- 
cates-amid the pestilential stench of Calcutta-in the Machua 
Bazaar, watches the daysbe born in the sea from a balcony in the state 
of Travancore, hesitates and kills at Indapur and closes its orbit of 
leagues and years in Bombay itself, a few paces away from the 
garden of the mooncolored hounds.' 
The succession of verbs predicating the subject "story" marks a 
progress toward absence: it "begins" and "continues" as most stories 
do, then it "lingers," "narrates" and "conspires." But when "the 
story" "prays and fornicates--amid the pestilential stench of Calcutta," 
the protagonist's mystique of presence is both subverted and enhanced 
by means of his simultaneous displacement or multiplication (in several 
predicates) and effacement (as the subject of these verbs).8 
Undifferentiation therefore is the mode (formal range) and the code 
(index of content) of this text. Singularity is multiplicity; the One shows 
itself as the Many. Even the ontological dichotomy (Being/Non-Being) 
is triangulated by the rhetoric of immediacy, which discursively pro- 
vokes a dynamic tension within the "infinite" chain of mediations that 
constitutes the mise en abyme reaching from Borges to his narrator to his 9
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reader/protagonist to an untold series of mediators to Al- Mu'tasim 
himself, who may or may not "be" identical to any of the preceding list. 
Merely writing the preceding sentence, which aspires to clarity, chal- 
lenges the writer's syntactical powers and, no doubt, the reader's 
patience. 
The undifferentiated series comprising the Borgesian narrative 
chain is rendered explicit, however, in order to pose the issue of the 
difference of difference. As I mentioned above, the "squalid man" is 
merely an early link in this chain. In the paragraph that begins "The plot 
is as follows:... ," we learn that the protagonist perceives "all at once," 
with "the miraculous consternation of Robinson Crusoe faced with the 
human footprint in the sand . . . a tenderness, an exaltation, a silence in 
one of the abhorrent men" with whom he has fallen "in a kind of contest 
of infamy." 
The narrator then cites Mir Bahadur Ali's prose directly: " 'It was as 
if a more complex interlocutor had joined the dialogue.- Suddenly the 
mode of undifferentiation is itself modulated by a newly revealed 
dialogic-ontological difference. The "more complex interlocutor," 
whose presence is sensed, intuited affectively by the protagonist but 
impossible to locate in his own presence, compels the infamous law 
student "to dedicate his life to finding him." 
This broken link in the chain of undifferentiation, then, implies an 
interlocutor of ipterlocutors, an author of authors, a narrator of narrators, 
and so on. Even the reader is implicated or caught in this inevitable 
succession: faced with the Borgesian text, we are the readers of readers, 
the "more complex" readers implied by the simultaneous presence and 
absence of the "more complex interlocutor." Undifferentiation chal- 
lenges the status of linguistic signs because language, as we have known 
since Saussure, consists only of differences. In the "social dramas" of 
myth, ritual and representation, however, difference vibrates with 
undifferentiation, and vice versa. 
This break corresponds precisely to the moment in the narrator's 
critique when his anti-allegorical bias comes full circle to bite him, 
ourouboros-style, as the snake of discernment tastes its own tail. After 
recounting what he calls "the general argument" of the novel, which is 
allegorically "burdened" with the weight of its immeasurability, he 
judges the work on literary grounds and opts in turn for what can only be 
called, from this reader's perspective, the allegory of mimesis and 
infinity, or the multi-fold parable of "infinite mimesis." The narrator 
pronounces the author a success in "the various invention of prophetic 
traits," but modestly allows himself incapable of passing judgment on 10




Mir Bahadur Ali's success at "seeing to it that the hero prefigured by 
these traits [Al- Mu'tasim] be no mere convention or phantom." 
"In other words:" he writes, "the extraordinary and unseen Al- 
Mu'tasim should give us the impression of a real character, not that of a 
jumble of insipid superlatives." The absence of such "supernatural 
notes" in the 1932 edition is cited as "literary good conduct," while the 
1934 edition "sinks into allegory" with its abundance of "grievous 
details. . . all meant to insinuate a unitary God who accomodates Himself 
to human diversities. To my mind," he concludes, "the idea is not very 
stimulating." 
This critical judgment constitutes the second crisis or climax of 
mediated immediacy in Borges' story: the narrator pronounces his 
preference, over the allegory of a unitary, accomodating God, for "the 
conjecture that the Almighty is also in search of Someone, and that 
Someone in search of some superior Someone (or merely indispensable 
or equal Someone), and thus on to the end-or better, the endlessness- 
of Time, or on and on in some cyclical form." 
Borges' characteristic undifferentiation of categories poses a range 
of difficult issues for philosophy. As Jaime Alazraki puts it, "The 
common denominator of all his fiction can be defined as a relativity 
which governs all things and which by being the result of a confrontation 
of opposites, takes on the appearance of a paradox and, at times of an 
oxymoron" (45). Would a philosophical grammar exclude such a mix? 
One tenet shared by analytic and deconstructionist philosophers is that 
such a prohibition represents a move to expand non-meaning, not restrict 
it: "a curious response," concludes Vincent Descombes, "to the demand 
for meaning" (1986, 19). 
On the other hand, the literature of mimesis, whether sacred or 
profane, has traditionally authorized and performed this mix on its own 
authority. Historically, Borges participates in and even generates the 
textual desires of an entire (post)modernist tradition of "self-engulfing" 
literary artefacts.' Whether this proliferation constitutes a misprision of 
the Borgesian sacred is a question, however, outside the scope of this 
paper. 
It is clear that any definitive distinction between "philosophy" and 
"literature" in Borges' case no longer holds. Recent criticism in the 
cognitive sciences has shown that the claims for textual autonomy by the 
nouveau roman (and the nouveau nouveau roman), post-structuralism 
and deconstructionism differ radically on this issue, yet also share several 
procedural assumptions. First, they share commonly held ideas: for 
example, that the "infinite regress" of mirrors mirroring mirrors can 
push an ontology of literature all the way to absolute autonomy. This 11
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mechanism, so prevalent in the literature of the mise en abyme, would 
hold that "The only way to escape from mimesis would be to multiply 
it to infinity. Mimesis could then only be deceived by itself- (Dupuy 
1989, 501). This is on the surface similar to the notion implied by 
Derridean differance, which would undermine the ontology of the sign 
based on "the Heideggerian strategy of the 'destruction' of the concept 
of truth as determined by homoiosis or adaequatio, a strategy shared by 
Derrida, the Derridians, the Lacanians, and the theoreticians of reflexiv- 
ity in literature such as Ricardou and Robbe-Grillet" (Dupuy 1989, 502). 
The important difference between deconstruction and theories of 
literary mise en abyme, however, emerges in Derrida's objection to the 
literary claims for the "productivity" of infinite regress, presented as 
"the present [of mimesis] unveiling the present: monstration, manifes- 
tation, production, aletheia. ," especially as praised and promoted by 
theorists of the nouveau roman.'° Derrida objects that the "production" 
of infinite mirroring "reflects no reality; it produces mere 'reality 
effects'," and therefore amounts not to production itself, but to the 
simulacrum of production (1981, 206). "In this speculum with no 
reality," he states: 
. . . in this mirror of a mirror, a difference or dyad does exist, since 
there are mimes and phantoms. But it is a difference without 
reference, or rather a reference without a referent, without any first 
or last unit, a ghost that is the phantom of no flesh, wandering about 
without a past, without any death, birth or presence. (1981, 206, qtd 
in slightly different form in Dupuy 1989, 502) 
It would be difficult to locate a passage more diametrically opposed 
to Rene Girard's claims for mimesis and for literature as the "science of 
desire," yet a comparison between these antithetical positions regarding 
the referent, especially in light of Borges' tale, may help us to understand 
the most crucial issues at stake here. 
The critical site for the referent in the nascent Borgesian sub-genre 
is askesis: discipline, or the renunciation of desire for desire's sake. The 
figuration of the infinite, so central to Borges' aesthetics, provides 
therefore a sort of contagious threshold deferral for the desiring reader 
or critic, the would-be subject of criticism whose part in "a game of 
shifting mirrors" makes her the object of her reader's interpretation. 
The "bewitched" rhetoric of immediacy exploited by the Borgesian 
genre thereby fulfills pleasure even as it would discipline or displace it. 
It provokes (meta)textual eroticism by its intertextual assertion, then 
denial, of unmediated primacy, which renunciation passes out the other 12




side of the decentered "doughnut of representation" in the form of 
deferred eras. "Text, in this [Michael Riffaterre's] view," writes Ross 
Chambers, "is 'shaped like a doughnut,' the hole being the absent and 
unexpressed verbal referent, or 'hypogram' " (95). 
Borgesian askesis, then, involves this sort of self-referential fram- 
ing-and Borges' catalogue of automorphic tropes (library, labyrinth, 
lottery of Babylon) is well known-of the precise moment of askesis, or 
desire deferred for the sake of desire. The textual act of displacement, 
therefore, is itself effectively displaced. 
His writing, however, may not represent the innovation Calvino 
claims it is, although this in no way diminishes its value. For like many 
nineteenth-century novels, the Borgesian deferral of textual authority 
simultaneously transmogrifies the character's and the reader's affective 
energies: the drama of the story (fabula, "the sum-total of events to be 
related in the work of fiction") gradually shifts away from the tale toward 
the frame, eventually taking place precisely in the compound communi- 
cation of this transference between sender (author), mediator (narrator/ 
character) and receiver (reader) (Erlich 240). "The Approach to Al- 
Mu'tasim" demonstrates that the parenthetical identities in this 
hermeneutic circuit-author, narrator/ character, and reader-are inter- 
changeable, just as Al- Mu'tasim may "be" the murdered Hindu, the 
despoiler of corpses or the "theologically indeterminate" homicidal 
protagonist himself. 
At the same time, the Borgesian narrative persona most often posits 
its own grounds of (self-)referential legitimacy performatively, by 
pronouncing critical judgments on books, or worlds, or Alephs that ought 
to exist. The second-level plot-its sjuzet, or the organization of its 
significance-even as it passes toward the frame of the intrigue, unfolds 
as it mediates the reader's desire to understand by deferring comprehen- 
sion itself (Erlich 240). Is the Borgesian structure of narrative askesis, in 
its maddeningly complex provocation and renunciation of metaphysical 
desire, so very different, therefore, from Nerval's or Flaubert's, or from 
Chesterton's for that matter? Perceptive readers of Madame Boyar), 
today are not likely to be more compelled by Emma's story-which 
might be paraphrased in a sentence or two-than they are by their 
understanding of Flaubert's multi-fold sjuzet, the novel's organizational 
allegory." 
Borges' narrator slyly and frankly undoes his seeming insistence on 
Bahadur's literary shortcomings in the last paragraph before the row of 
stars that separates the body of the text from the ending. For here he 
expresses uncertainty regarding his own criticism: "After rereading, I 
am apprehensive lest I have not sufficiently underlined the book's 13
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virtues." The "civilized expression" he cites as a counter-example to his 
expressed reservations reveals its own secret intertext: ". . . for example, 
a certain argument in the nineteenth chapter in which one feels a 
presentiment that one of the antagonists is a friend of Al-Mu' tasim when 
he will not refute the sophisms of his opponent 'so as not to be right in 
a triumphal fashion.' " 
The narrator's appreciation here echoes the highest political wisdom 
regarding restraint in the Tao Teh Ching (third century B.C.), which 
states: "Conduct your triumph as a funeral" (Lao Tzu 45). His initial 
reservations and demurrers regarding his fellow critics (or, in Girard's 
term, his "internal mediators") are thereby economically undone 
because he finds the refusal of "triumphant" critical rectitude a higher 
value in the very text he is criticizing. The text becomes, thereby, the 
critic's "external mediator." The narrator also undermines his own 
expressed disdain for allegory (a distaste explicated on historical grounds, 
and therefore explained away, by Borges in his essay "From Allegories 
to Novels") by taking issue with the censurious nineteenth-century critic 
of Spenser, agreeing instead with Eliot's approving judgment regarding 
Gloriana' s absence from the seventy cantos of The Fairie Queene. Again, 
the drama of this shift on the narrator's part loses something in my 
paraphrase; the attentive reader cannot help but ponder, nonetheless, its 
elaboration as mediated by the context of Bahadur's novel. 
A well-known Zen parable illustrates the rhetoric of immediacy in 
relation to the very problems explored by Borges' text. Case 14 of the 
Gateless Gate (Mumonkan, 13th century) tells the following story: 
Once the monks of the eastern and western Zen halls were quarrel- 
ling about a cat. Nansen held up the cat and said, "You monks! If 
one of you can say a word, I will spare the cat. If you can't say 
anything, I will put it to the sword. " No one could answer, so Nansen 
finally slew it. In the evening when Joshu returned, Nansen told him 
what had happened. Joshu, thereupon, took off his sandals, put them 
on his head and walked off. Nansen said, "If you had been there, I 
could have spared the cat." (Hui-k'ai 223) 
Between two "sovereigns" of wisdom, or Masters, the challenge to 
linguistic competence issued initially by Nansen to the group of quarrel- 
ling monks is transformed: from an impossible task-to speak the 
unspeakable-to a possible one, to show it. Hence, Joshu's gesture of 
(non)response would have effectively saved the life of the cat, had Joshu 
been present to make it. The "immediacy" of his feline-saving gesture- 
-itself absurdly unrelated to the issue in its content-would suffice to 14




arrest the violent act, which replicates sacrificial violence, especially in 
the group dynamics of dispute and judicial arbitration by Nansen. The 
rhetoric of immediacy, then, may be found in the representation and re- 
telling of this anecdote as an heuristic device. Zen favors the act of 
"immediate" presence over the "enchantment" of a language that 
would presume to speak the Unspeakable, but it must resort to the mythic- 
heuristic representation of the act in order to pose the problem itself. The 
rhetoric of immediacy, in such cases, both promotes and undermines 
mediation. 
Likewise, Case 44 in the Gateless Gate reads as follows: "Master 
Basho said to his disciples, `If you have a shujo, I will give it to you. If 
you have no shujo, I will take it away from you- (223). When the 
disciples in Matthew 13:10 ask Jesus why he speaks to people in parables, 
he responds with another parable: "To you it has been given to know the 
secrets of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it has not been given. For 
to him who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from 
him who has not, even what he has will be taken away" (1187). 
Like these traditional or sacred parables, the mechanism by which 
Borges' "modernist" text operates is both immanent in its form (the 
semantic doubling and persistence of absence in language) and produc- 
tively transcendent in the doubly-bound tension it establishes between 
desire and askesis. Why "doubly bound"? Because the ontological 
plenitude of Al- Mu'tasim simultaneously compels imitation (in identity) 
and defeats it (in difference). Self-reflexively, the text's renunciation of 
the desire for closure (in the name of metaphysical desire) mirrors the 
narrator/critic's eventual renunciation of any split between concept and 
mimesis. 
These developments themselves work to renounce or counteract the 
very immanence initially produced by its form (as a review of a detective 
story). This is discussed by Adomo in terms of "sensuous immediacy," 
a quality of spirit in the art work which "is not an aberration of art but 
a useful corrective to it" (1984, 133). Accordingly, it is neither the 
inherent presence nor absence of spirit in the work that accedes to the 
appearance of immediacy, but rather "the negation of that appearance, 
being at one with the phenomenon and yet opposed to it" (1984, 131). 
Indeed, Adorno's analysis of modern art works accounts in one way 
for the dynamic "movement" of Borges' story, which generates the 
communicability of issues posed in terms of totalizing (or theological) 
mediation and the drama of renunciation on the part of the critic: 
The strict immanence of spirit in works of art is contradicted by a 
counter-trend which is no less immanent and which is the tendency 15
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of art works to try to escape the hermetic quality of their own 
structures, to make deliberate incisions, and to abrogate the totality 
of appearance. Since the spirit of a work of art is not co-extensive 
with that work, it breaks the objective form which is constitutive of 
art. This break is the instant of apparition. (1984, 131) 
This "instant of apparition" in "The Approach to Al-Mulasim" is 
doubled within the structure of the story, yet the protagonist's encounter 
in the framed tale with the Unknowable is, in my view, less crucial than 
the narrator/critic's similar encounter in the last line of the body of the 
text. Writers who treat this story discuss the theme ofthe "eternal return" 
and the student/protagonist's "endless journey of postponements" 
before citing the scene where he asks, through "a cheap and copiously 
beaded mat curtain," for Al- Mu'tasim. "A man's voice-the incredible 
voice of Al-Mulasim-urges him to come in. The student draws back 
the curtain and steps forward. The novel ends."12 
This is, in my opinion, only the first (and lesser) of the two 
apparitions in the story. The second, more crucial and revealing, occurs 
in the narrator's final criticism when, after complaining bitterly about the 
"derivations" detected in Bahadur's novel by "harebrained" critics in 
London, Allahabad and Calcutta, he champions an opinion by Eliot 
regarding the absence of the heroine from all seventy cantos of "the 
incomplete allegory The Faerie Queen [sic]." This opinion, he states, 
was "previously pointed out in a censure by Richard William Church 
(Spenser, 1879)." flow can one account for this "critical" shift on the 
narrator's part, away from the fishing expeditions for predecessors 
stupidly played out by his "harebrained" fellow critics toward the 
positively promoted virtue, in an allegory no less-a genre for which he 
expresses scorn in the context of the novel-of the total and utterly 
mysterious absence of the main character from a literary work? 
The answer to this question lies in the "conversion" of the critic. 
This information is so subtly delivered, however,-in a parable, without 
insistence-that the story itself becomes an allegory of reading as 
mimesis, of mediation as the only way of access to the unmediated. In the 
last two sentences of the body of the text (there is a note appended to this 
ending, about which I will speak below) the narrator speaks "frankly" 
instead of "critically," revealing as he does his own mediation by the 
material he would ostensibly master: 
With all humility, I wish to mention a distant, and possible, 
predecessor: the Jerusalem cabalist Isaac Luria, who in the sixteenth 
century proclaimed that the soul of an ancestor or that of a master 16




might enter the soul of an unfortunate to comfort or instruct him. 
Ibbitr is the name for this type of metempsychosis.* 
Literally, the critic/narrator musters here the claim for metaphysical, 
even mystical, influence by forces absented or distant in time, space, and 
even ontology as an explanation for how Bahadur came to write his novel. 
Uncannily, he has been drawn into the "great chain" of mediation 
posited by the text under his consideration and "with all humility" 
claims that the "soul of a master" has entered the soul of the author. He 
helpfully identifies the term for "this type of metempsychosis," in the 
conceptual or critical mode, in what seems an anti-climactic last line; 
mimetically, however, the fact that he would claim such an explanation 
and support it with the "original" (or culture-specific) terminology 
means that he himself vouches for this "source" in Bahadur. The spirit 
of Al- Mu'tasim, in the final drama of this "essay," passes through the 
spirit and the letter of the framed author (Mir Bahadur Ali) into the spirit 
and the letter of the frame narrator. 
The further information regarding his collapse into the mystique of 
presence at the center of the fiction comes near the end of the final note, 
marked with an asterisk at the end of the body of the story. Still addressing 
the issue of "precursors" of Bahadur' s text (in this case, Attar's Colloquy 
of the Birds), the narrator states that the analogies he discerns "may 
merely signify the identification of the searcher with the sought; they also 
might mean that the latter influences the former." Explicitly, the absent 
one (the sought) influences the seeker, even to the point of identification. 
The Girardian analysis of these claims would raise two important 
issues, in my opinion. First, the mediator he describes as "internal" 
(sharing the same ontology) or "external" (separated ontologically) is 
here combined and undifferentiated to a volatile and all the more 
"contagious" or "communicable" degree: 
Obviously it is not physical space that measures the gap between 
mediator and the desiring subject. Although geographical separa- 
tion might be one factor, the distance between mediator and subject 
is primarily spiritual. . . . The closer the mediator comes, the greater 
his role becomes. . . . (1965, 45) 
Second, the root cause of the "approach" to the mediator on the part 
of the protagonist/student is an irrationally provoked, contagiously 
crowd-mediated act of religious violence. The specter of sacrificial 
murder, in Girard's thesis, haunts all religions. The confluence in the 
novel's opening crowd scenes of Islam and Hinduism, faced with the 17
Winchell: The Oldest Trick in the Book: Borges and the "Rhetoric of Immedia
Published by New Prairie Press
214 S7UL, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer, 1993) 
"free-thinking" atheism of the protagonist, makes the "sacrificial 
crisis" in progress, with its characteristic melt-down of difference, all the 
more contagious and the strategies for its representation all the more 
complex. 
As I noted above, Borges' narrative of his reader's "essay" on 
Bahadur's novel is told in the mode and by the code of undifferentiation: 
the protagonist, killing the Hindu, takes a step closer to Al- Mu'tasim; we 
learn later (by authorial insinuation) that the victim himself was, just 
possibly, "always already" Al-Mu'tasim. The frame narrator reveals 
compelling evidence, by his change of critical tone and his concluding 
remarks, that he can bear personal witness to "this type of 
metempsychosis," and I feel it would not be an unjust extrapolation from 
the spirit and the letter of the text to propose that the narrator, too, is Al- 
Mu'tasim. 
I also stated above that Borges' story is a sacred text ("disguised 
theology") masquerading as something else, and I think it is on the 
grounds of undifferentiation and the representation of a "secular ritual" 
of criticism (in the narrator's reading ofBahadur) that the full hermeneutic 
import of this story may be grasped. For structuralist anthropology, 
undifferentiation (corresponding to ritual) and differentiation (corre- 
sponding to myth) are principles that may be radically separated and 
distinguished on the grounds of language and its determinate role in 
differentiating objects. For Rene Girard, however, it is impossible to 
drive a wedge between myth and ritual because both function together 
in any given anthropology: 
In order to achieve undifferentiation, myths, as well as rituals, resort 
to make-believe. . . In myth as well as in ritual, this undifferentiated 
can only be a representation. (1978, 156-57) 
Objecting to Levi-Strauss' s privileging of myth (associated with 
language) over ritual (associated with non-verbal religion), Girard argues 
here that, on the contrary, the two work together in a "parallelism" that 
combines both forces in social processes that tend toward the "regenera- 
tion of differences" (1978, 156). The important point, he concludes, is 
not to privilege one over the other, but rather to see that their relationship 
"remains indeterminate, behind an appearance ofdetermination" (1978, 
171). 
This structural, thematic and even anthropological truth lies at the 
center of Borges' story. Behind the "appearance ofdetermination" at the 
conclusion of the text (the narrator's claim for "metempsychosis") lies 
the larger, more subtle and complex indeterminacy of the claim itself: its 18




relation to his criticism of the novel and the insufficiency signalled by the 
desperate proliferation of asterisks, footnotes, and lists of mediating 
predecessors. Along with the second-level significance of the story, these 
features signal an opening-out of critical perspectives, a breaking-open 
of the writer's conceptual sphere, which the reader might normally 
expect at the beginning of a critical essay, rather than at the end. This 
gesture, far from marking any triumphant conclusion or closure, works 
in the opposite direction. 
Borges' text illuminates an issue central to current philosophy, 
hermeneutics and literary criticism: the problem of "centrality" itself 
and of language's access to it. The narrative's exploitation of mise en 
abyme and its aggressively textual insistence on its own procedures mark 
it as a work of modernity, yet its themes, incidents and deployment of the 
rhetoric of immediacy reveal it as a traditional, "sacred" text in the 
hermeneutic sense described above. Its self-referentiality, its "disguised 
theology" veils nothing else than the masks assumed by the sacred, or 
the Unspeakable, the Unknowable, or "all those forces whose domi- 
nance over man increases or seems to increase in proportion to man's 
effort to master them" (Girard 1977, 31). 
The social crisis of undifferentiation, reflected in the opening 
chapter of Bahadur's novel, results in an uncannily "motivated" yet 
nonetheless "irrational" violence that spreads contagiously like ripples 
on a pond; so, too, spreads the totalizing omni-identity of Al-Mu'tasim, 
"the more complex interlocutor," who alternately conceals and displays 
the vicissitudes of difference in language and experience. 
The last issue raised by Vincent Descombes in the introduction to his 
"philosophical grammar" concerns the questions contemporary phi- 
losophy must pose for itself: not in terms of method-which he 
pronounces "after all, a peripheral matter" -but rather in terms of "the 
nature of philosophical questions . . . in other words, what philosophy is 
capable of (1986, 14). 
The critique of affective reason I detect in Borges' text is the same 
one toward which critical disciplines may be tending in the "post- 
theoretical" era. Theories of self-reference and applied epistemologies 
break down long-standing disciplinary differences in the name of new 
knowledge. One final thought-experiment here will show that Borges' 
parable also shares features with model paradoxes used by logicians to 
demonstrate criteria of belief and induction. 
Paul Berent's parable of the 99-foot man poses the following 
situation: 19
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Say you subscribe to the reasonable belief: "All human beings are 
less than 100 feet tall." Everyone you've ever seen is a confirming 
instance of this hypothesis. Then one day you go to the circus and 
see a 99-foot tall man. Surely you leave the circus far less confident 
that all people are less than 100 feet tall. Why? The 99-foot man is 
yet another confirming instance. (Poundstone 39) 
There are two reasons for the confusion regarding the operative 
hypothesis, despite the fact that the 99-foot tall man does not contravene 
it: first, language has imperfectly expressed the intent of the hypothesis, 
"bewitching" it instead with an outsized scale of proportions. Its 
"hypothetical intent" is easily transgressed by examples that approach 
the limit of applicability (100 feet) without surpassing it. Consequently, 
an effective disconfirmation of the 100-foot hypothesis is achieved by 
"non-essential information " -i.e., that in one instance one man ap- 
proaches (like Al- Mu'tasim and his seeker) the limit of hypothetical 
truth. If our data were limited to a binary read-out of criteria yes/no, 
marked 100-feet/less-than-100-feet, our judgment would not be affected 
in the least by the 99-foot man. He would be just another "no" on our 
yes/no list His height-or the variable heights of any beings-would 
constitute non-essential information. 
Borges has provided a parable of what philosopher Rudolf Carnap 
has called "the requirement of total evidence," which in inductive 
reasoning decrees the use of all available information (Poundstone 40). 
As William Poundstone states it: 
The requirement of total evidence has occasioned much soul- 
searching in the scientific community because it addresses much of 
the research arena of biochemistry, astronomy, physics, and other 
fields... . /fwe are ignorant ofother factors [ "total evidence ' 7, and 
necessarily so, then we can generalize onlyfrom the information that 
is available. (41, emphases added) 
In "The Approach to Al-Mu'tashn," Borges has acceded to a sacred 
hermeneutics previously unavailable to or methodologically excluded 
by both scientific induction and current philosophy. He has delivered this 
information to a disenchanted modernity by disguising it as "criticism," 
textually distanced from the reader's experience by the very concept of 
critical discernment and judgment" 
Borges has thereby provided contemporary theory and the human 
sciences with not one, but a "mathematically burdened" series of 99- 
foot men, all of whom contribute to the total evidence currently 20




acknowledged as essential, if inaccessible, to the hard sciences. A 
Borgesian syllogism is thus established: No being is all beings (No human 
is more than 100 feet tall); Some beings, however, are many beings 
(Some humans are 99 feet). In writing, for Borges, there is no "non- 
essential" information. 
Our contemporary "philosophy in decline," as Vincent Descombes 
has written, can no longer afford to indulge "the tendency to regard those 
issues that puzzle all genuine philosophy as minor" (1986, 20-21). These 
issues include the mimetic character of desire, the uncanny relation 
between violence and the social bond, death and askesis."The Approach 
to Al- Mu'tasim" exemplifies Borges' "science" of reading as experi- 
ence: his critique of affective reason. This, too, is a necessary 
metempsychosis, a revealing mirror of Ibbar. 
Notes 
1. Adorno writes: "The substance of concepts is . . . both immanent, as far 
as the mind is concerned, and transcendent as far as being is concerned. To 
be aware of this is to be able to get rid of concept fetishism. Philosophical 
reflection makes sure of the nonconceptual in the concept. It would be empty 
otherwise, according to Kant's dictum; in the end, having ceased to be a 
concept of anything at all, it would be nothing." 
2. I am grateful to Bernard Faure for introducing me to this term. 
3. For a slightly different description of this issue, cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E. Linge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976) 95 if.: "If we define the task of 
hermeneutics as the bridging of the personal or historical distance between 
minds, then the experience of art would seem to fall entirely outside its 
province. For of all the things that confront us in nature and history, it is the 
work of art that speaks to us most directly. It possesses a mysterious 
intimacy that grips our entire being, as if there were no distance at all and 
every encounter with it were an encounter with ourselves." 
4. These readers, some of whom attempted to order copies of Bahadur Ali's 
novel after reading Borges' "review," seemingly privileged the rhetoric of 
the narrator's critical authority over the nascent, innovative and "Borgesian" 
play of sublimated mirrors. Short of possessing expert knowledge of 
contemporary popular Indian detective fiction-and thereby the capacity to 
reject the "bewitchment" effected by the narrator's mixing of historical 
and fictional authors-how could they do otherwise? Incidentally, Calvino's 21
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version of this story omits the fact that this story, written as early as 1935, 
originally appeared in Historia de la eternidad in 1936; cf. Jorge Luis 
Borges, Obras completas, Vol I (Buenos Aires: Emece Editores, 1974). 
5. All citations from this very short story refer to this translation and edition 
and will not be further noted. 
6. Eugene Webb informs me that Borges' choice of "the tenth of Muharrain" 
as the day of the riot is extremely significant because it commemorates the 
martyrdom of Hussein, Muhammad's grandson and a candidate for succes- 
sion to Muhammad's leadership role; his abandonment by the Shi'i led to 
his death, for which the Shi'i flagellate themselves in procession on this day 
in self-punishment for their predecessors' failure to come to Hussein's aid. 
The symbolism of his status as a sinless victim, Webb goes on to say, implies 
that his death is a kind of redemptive sacrifice and that it therefore shows 
an influence derived from Christian imagery. 
7. I should note here an important difference in the more recent translation 
of this story by Norman Thomas di Giovanni "in collaboration with the 
author" in The Aleph and Other Stories (New York: Dutton, 1979). 
Precisely at this juncture (immediately before the verb "conspires"), di 
Giovanni adds a semi-colon and a new subject ("the hero") for the verbs 
"prays and fornicates." Even though this subject is not present in the 
original Spanish, we can only assume he added it with the author's approval. 
In effect, this addition unduly "simplifies" the text. 
8. This phrase ("The story . . . prays and fornicates") is reminiscent of a 
sentence in another story by Borges, "TIon Ugbar, Orbis Tertius," to the 
effect that "mirrors and copulation are abominable, because they both 
multiply the numbers of men." Jean-Pierre Dupuy (1989, 502) concludes 
that this warning parallels "Derrida's message-that one can escape 
mimesis only through mimesis." He goes on to demonstrate, however, the 
complication of this idea in deconstruction as expressed in the "Derridean 
motto," "Neither re-production nor production." The shift from the first 
claim to second marks the very site of the split between literary theorists of 
self-reflexive texts (who see Derridean "differance" as support for their 
claim for inherent "productions" of mise en abyme) and Derrida himself, 
who rejects "production' on grounds of the absence of any possible origin. 
9. For an excellent philosophical analysis of this issue, cf. Lucien DAllenbach, 
The Mirror in the Text, trans. Jeremy Whiteley with Emma Hughes 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). Orig. Publ. as Le Recit speculaire: essai 
sur la mise en abyme (Paris: Seuil, 1977). 
10. Cf. Derrida (1981, 206), as qtd in Dupuy (1989, 502). 22




11. Dominick la Capra, in Madame Bovary On Trial, makes the fascinating 
point that Second-Empire prosecutors of Flaubert's novel actually emerged 
as the more fluent and incisive readers or interpreters of the "demoraliz- 
ing" allegory expressed by the novel's sjuzet. The author's defense attor- 
ney, on the other hand, manifests a complacent, even superficial reliance on 
the "poetic justice" of the novel's story, an interpretive strategy that is 
itself intellectually ambiguous and highly problematic, not to mention 
legally ineffective. A recent work that provides insight along these lines in 
Joel Kovel's "On Reading Madame Bovary Psychoanalytically," in The 
Radical Spirit: Essays on Psychoanalysis and Society (London: Free Asso- 
ciation Books, 1988) 33-52. For current problems in this area, cf my 
contribution to Approaches to Teaching Madame Bovary (Laurence M. 
Porter and Eugene F. Gray, eds.; New York: MLA, 1993), "Reading (in) 
Madame Bovary." 
12. Fora sympathetic but, in my opinion, too "magical" reading of Borges, 
cf. Ana Maria Barrenechea, Borges the Labyrinth Maker, ed. & trans. 
Robert Lima (New York: New York University Press, 1965) passim. 
13. In Jorge Luis Borges: A Literary Biography (New York: E.P. Dutton, 
1978), Emir Rodriguez Monegal cites this remark made by Borges (in a 
1966 interview with Ronald Christ), in which he describes the sales of The 
History of Eternity: "I remember I published a book . . . and at the end of 
the year I found out that no less than thirty-seven copies had been sold! .. . 
At first I wanted to find every single one of the buyers to apologize because 
of the book and also to thank them for what they had done. There is an 
explanation for that. If you think of thirty-seven people-those people are 
real, I mean, every one of them has a face of his own, a family, he lives in 
his own particular street. Why, if you sell, say two thousand copies, it is the 
same thing as if you sold nothing at all, because two thousand is too vast- 
I mean, for the imagination to grasp. While thirty-seven people-perhaps 
thirty-seven are too many, perhaps seventeen would have been better or even 
seven-but still thirty-seven are still within the scope of one's imagina- 
tion." 
On the issue of disguised theology and sacred texts, Borges' primary 
mediator may be Franz Kafka, about whom Borges wrote what must surely 
constitute the most incisive formulation of critical anxiety and influence: 
"The fact is that each writer creates his precursors." It is no accident that 
this truth-a truth that much of modern criticism has labored mightily to 
unpack-should emerge in a critical appreciation of Kafka. For Gershom 
Scholem, the issue of revelation is treated in Kafka's "linguistic world" as 
a representation of "the prosaic in its most canonical form" (cf his letter 
to Walter Benjamin of August 1, 1931, cited in Robert Alter, Necessary 
Angels: Tradition and Modernity in Kafka, Benjamin and Scholem [Cam- 
bridge: Harvard UP, 1991] 106). 23
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